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Abstract—Multiple studies have illustrated the potential for
dramatic societal, environmental and economic benefits from
significant penetration of autonomous driving. However, all the
current approaches to autonomous driving require the automo-
tive manufacturers to shoulder the primary responsibility and
liability associated with replacing human perception and decision
making with automation, potentially slowing the penetration of
autonomous vehicles, and consequently slowing the realization
of the societal benefits of autonomous vehicles. We propose here
a new approach to autonomous driving that will re-balance the
responsibility and liabilities associated with autonomous driving
between traditional automotive manufacturers, infrastructure
players, and third-party players. Our proposed distributed in-
telligence architecture leverages the significant advancements in
connectivity and edge computing in the recent decades to parti-
tion the driving functions between the vehicle, edge computers
on the road side, and specialized third-party computers that
reside in the vehicle. Infrastructure becomes a critical enabler
for autonomy. With this Infrastructure Enabled Autonomy (IEA)
concept, the traditional automotive manufacturers will only need
to shoulder responsibility and liability comparable to what they
already do today, and the infrastructure and third-party players
will share the added responsibility and liabilities associated with
autonomous functionalities. We propose a Bayesian Network
Model based framework for assessing the risk benefits of such a
distributed intelligence architecture. An additional benefit of the
proposed architecture is that it enables “autonomy as a service”
while still allowing for private ownership of automobiles.
Index Terms—autonomous vehicles, infrastructure, connectiv-
ity, edge computing, distributed intelligence architecture
I. INTRODUCTION
Transportation systems and associated mobility are at the
cusp of a tectonic shift. Human beings have traditionally been
in the drivers seat of automobiles and that is beginning to
change with the emergence of various automation capabilities
in automobiles. This shift is heralded as potentially providing
huge benefits to the society at large. Studies predict that with
a 50% penetration, autonomous vehicles will result in 9,600
lives saved per year, 1.9 million fewer crashes, $50 billion in
economic savings, 1.6 billion hours saved through less time
traveled, and 224 million less gallons of fuel consumed [1].
The primary rationale for why autonomous driving will
improve safety is the premise that automobile technologies will
be mature enough that they will be inherently safe. Human
errors cause the majority of all traffic accidents [2], and by
automating human decision making, we could improve overall
safety.
The auto industry has evolved over decades, with safety
as a primary driving factor in the design and development.
While the physical components of the modern automobile have
become quite safe and reliable (failures of engines, transmis-
sions or other such systems are quite rare), the safety-focus
has been challenged by the rapid growth in both scope and
complexity of embedded software functionality in cars. The
number of software related recalls are growing exponentially
[3]. Such safety concerns are exacerbated for autonomous
vehicles, where we are trying to replace human decision
making with algorithms. The use of machine learning for
both perception and decision making brings in an inherent
non-determinism to the system performance making it nearly
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to assert performance
safety of the autonomous vehicles. (e.g. [4].
Thus, for autonomous vehicles, the automotive OEM be-
comes saddled with both the responsibility and liabilities asso-
ciated with the traditional capabilities of the vehicle, but also
those associated with functions that human beings routinely
perform. In section II below, we look at this distribution in
more detail, and propose a new architecture that effectively
reduces this liability to the automotive OEMs through a re-
balancing with the infrastructure. Section III describes the
new proposed concept in greater detail. Section IV provides a
mathematical framework for analyzing the reduction in risks
and demonstrates this through a numerical example. Section
V provides some conclusions including the value proposition
of the concept and open research themes for further consider-
ation.
II. DISTRIBUTION OF LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN
PERSONAL AUTOMOTIVE TRANSPORTATION
A. Distribution of responsibility and liability for modern non-
autonomous cars
Using a high level functionally decomposition of the modern
automobile with its driver and connectivity, we can identify a
distribution of responsibilities as illustrated in the schematic
of Fig.1 below.
The automotive OEM has a clear responsibility to provide
the following functionalities:
• Primary driving (or powertrain) functions: Namely to
provide the torque, power and steering needed to drive the
car. Most modern cars are drive-by-wire (DBW) enabled,
i.e., the inputs from the driver (such as accelerator pedal,
brake pedal or steering) are converted to appropriate actu-
ation signals to the lower level actuators. The conversion
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Figure 1: Current distribution of driving responsibilities (non-autonomous)
comprehends any internal constraints arising from the
physics of the system as well as those posed by usability
and driver comfort.
• Display of diagnostic and other sensor information about
the vehicle to the driver. This would include direct infor-
mation such as the vehicle and engine speed as well as
more nuanced information such as average fuel economy
or available range, or diagnostic information such as the
engine needs to be serviced shortly.
• Display of information outside of the vehicle. This would
include passive devices such as rear-view and side-view
mirrors, to more active devices such as blind-spot detec-
tion or distance to obstacles.
The automotive OEM may source some of the capabilities
from suppliers, however retains the responsibility and liability.
The automaker may facilitate availability of information from
outside by leveraging external infrastructure such as Enhanced
Global Positioning System (GPS), cloud based services such
as OnStar, Google, etc., broadcast radio, etc. The automaker
might also facilitate delivery of some traffic-specific informa-
tion through such infrastructure. The infrastructure is managed
by infrastructure operators. The information is then used by
the driver to generate situational awareness of the car and its
surroundings and make appropriate decisions while driving.
Situational awareness will include an understanding of the
cars own driving status (such as its velocity, acceleration,
location, etc.) called the self-awareness, and an understanding
of the cars surroundings (objects near by, their state of motion,
traffic signals and other road signs, etc) called the contextual-
awareness. The automaker OEM assumes competent driving.
The driver remains responsible and liable for their driving.
The modern automobile also has some support functions
from the OEMs to support some driver actions (such as lane
change, obstacle avoidance, etc.). When the OEM provides
such functionalities, clearly the OEM has responsibility and
liability for those. Correspondingly these functions are being
deployed very cautiously by the automakers. These function-
alities are just Advance Driver Assistance Systems, and the
driver remains ready to take back complete control at any time
while driving.
B. Distribution of responsibility and liability per the current
paradigm for Autonomous Vehicles
The distribution of responsibility changes dramatically once
we consider autonomous vehicles, especially with autonomy
levels of 3 or higher. Fig.2 shows how the responsibility of
the OEM increases to include Situational Awareness synthesis
and decision making. (This is all the time for Level 5, while
intermittent for other levels of automation).
Situational awareness synthesis has made tremendous
strides in recent years leveraging advances in Machine Learn-
ing, Vision Processing, and sensor technologies such as in
LIDARs and RADARs, and there is a high confidence amongst
that this will be a solved problem in the near future, e.g. [5].
However, there continues to be a note of caution from several
software safety experts ( [4]).
Decision making continues to be a big open question
because it is no longer a matter of identifying and classifying
the physical world (as was in Situation Awareness synthesis),
but it is a question of identifying and classifying “human
intent” (of other drivers and pedestrians). While many novel
methods are being applied to tackle this part of the driving
functionality, (e.g. [6]), the problem fundamentally remains
non-deterministic. Correspondingly the uncertainty related to
the performance, and the risks and liabilities remain. Despite
the very many exciting announcements about introduction of
autonomous vehicles, there have also been voices of caution
(e.g. [7] ).
C. Proposed Paradigm-shift in the distribution of responsi-
bilities and liabilities
We propose a new paradigm for autonomous vehicle driv-
ing: The OEMs shall take direct responsibility (and liability)
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Figure 2: Distribution of driving responsibility in autonomous vehicles
for the core capabilities related to driving (DBW and vehicle-
level sensing). But they will not take direct responsibility for
decision making or generating the situational awareness.
The situational awareness will be generated through sensors
that are embedded in the infrastructure. Thus, the responsibil-
ity (and liability) for situational awareness is shifted to the
infrastructure operators.
Decision making is provided by yet another third party that
takes the situational awareness information coming from the
infrastructure operators (leveraging the connectedness of the
infrastructure), and uses standardized Application Program-
ming Interfaces (APIs) to interface with the DBW capabilities
of the OEM to drive the cars autonomously.
This distribution is captured in Fig.3. The new redistribution
of the responsibilities will suddenly create opportunities for
deployment hitherto not possible. The OEMs will continue
to build on their core competencies. They could partner with
third parties to provide decision making algorithms, with the
business participation commensurate with the liability they are
willing to accept. Traditional infrastructure operators (such as
toll booth operators or cellular phone operators) can now take
on value-added business, bringing a much needed infusion of
new business to their nearly commoditized business models.
III. THE NEW PROPOSED PARADIGM: INFRASTRUCTURE
ENABLED AUTONOMY (IEA)
A. Concept Overview
Fig.4 is a pictorial representation of the IEA concept.
IEA will be deployed on special traffic corridors that we
call Special Infrastructure Enabled Traffic Corridors (SIETC).
Figure 5 shows one such corridor with mixed traffic consisting
of automated and manually driven vehicles, as well as other
traffic such as pedestrian and bicyclists. We will call the
vehicles automated through the IEA concept as the IEA
vehicles.
Road-Side-Units (RSUs) on the infrastructure will be fitted
with special devices that we will call Multi-Sensor-Smart-
Packs (MSSPs). The MSSPs will monitor the SIETC and
generate situatioal awareness (SA) information that will be
transmitted using wireless means to special devices that we
will call SmartConnects (SCs).
The SCs typically reside in the IEA vehicle, and interface
with the DBW capabilities of the car and provide the com-
mands to drive autonomously. The SCs could also be deployed
on manually driven vehicles, as well as individual passengers
(through smart-phone-type devices). In this case, the SCs will
use the SA information to provide guidance and warnings to
the users.
As the vehicle travels through the SIETC, special hand-
shake protocols will be used by SCs to engage with the
different MSSPs along the way.
The IEA vehicles will normally be driven by a human driver.
When the driver enters an SIETC, there will be an electronic
engagement with the corridor, wherein the driver could choose
to be driven autonomously. If the driver desires to do so, there
is an appropriate handshake with the corridor, and the vehicle
is driven autonomously as described above. When it it time
for the driver to take control back, depending on the alertness
of the driver, either the driver take control back, or the vehicle
is parked in designated take-over spot. (The SIETCs will be
defined to facilitate such a deployment.) A typical deployment
scenario that could be envisioned with the IEA concept is
shown in Fig.5 below.
B. Functional Overview of the IEA
Fig.6 shows a functional architecture of the IEA concept.
We will describe the major components of this IEA architec-
ture below.
C. Special Infrastructure Enabled Traffic Corridors (SIETC)
From a business viability perspective, IEA will generate
maximum value and so deployed where traffic density is high
and when the drivers are not traveling for fun. This would
3
Figure 3: Distribution of driving responsibility in the Infrastructure Enabled Autonomy (IEA) Concept
Figure 4: Sample Overview Schematic of the IEA Concept
typically be urban commuter traffic. These roads and streets-
(or designated lanes within them) will have been fitted with
MSSPs, and will be connectivity-enabled.
The SIETCs will be operated by infrastructure operators,
similar to toll-booth operators. When a vehicle uses the
SIETC, depending on the services that they receive from the
SIETC, they will be charged by the infrastructure operator
based on usage.
D. Connectivity within in a SIETC
The SIETC will have connectivity technologies that will
server three levels of communication:
• Level 1 Communication: This refers to communication
from an MSSP to moving devices in the neighborhood
of the MSSP. The key requirement is that this communi-
cation be wireless. The required range of communication
is relatively small. Examples would include DSRC, Wifi,
cellular, 5G, etc.
• Level 2 Communication: This refers to communication
between neighboring MSSPs. This is expected to be
dedicated very high speed communication, such as fiber
optics.
• Level 3 Communication: This refers to communication
between the MSSPs and a cloud-based computing capa-
bility that provides support for perception, classification,
etc.
E. Multiple-Sensor Smart Packs (MSSPs)
The MSSPs will consist of (i) multi-sensor packs that moni-
tor the road, (ii) computers that process the sensed information
and generate the SA information, (iii) wireless connectivity to
transmit the SA to Smart-Connects (SCs), and (iv) appropriate
power supply to support its operations.
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Figure 5: Example Deployment Scenario with IEA
Figure 6: A Functional Schematic of the IEA Concept
A sensor pack would contain one or more sensors of
different types (such as LIDAR, RADAR, optical camera,
thermal camera, etc.). Some of these sensors may themselves
be “smart”, i.e. have local processing. However, we will defer
the critical sensor fusion functions to the compute capability
of the MSSPs, dubbed “SmartInfra”.
The SmartInfra has the following primary functions:
1) Synthesis of Situational Awareness (SA) Information :
A key function of the SmartInfra would be to generate the SA
information.
It is to be noted that the MSSPs have ground-truth since
they are stationary and can be precisely geo-located after
installation. Therefore, GPS availability is not a concern at any
time during the operation. The combination of sensors such
as LIDAR, RADAR, thermal and optical allow for 24-hour
availability of information. The fusion of the sensors provides
a rich starting point for further processing such as classification
and subsequently contextualization, leading to good, first level
SA information. This information can be further reconciled
with observations from the different SCs engaged with the
MSSP as well as neighboring MSSPs. To do this, model based
observers of the environment shall be used to account for the
dynamic movements of the various objects in the environment.
Such environment observer calculations may be intensive and
could partly be off-loaded to the cloud.
2) SC Registration and Communication Management:
Another important function of the SmartInfra is to ensure
appropriate handshake and communication with the individual
SCs. Loosely speaking, each MSSP will function like a Cell
Tower, and each SC will act like a cell phone. The SIETC gets
broken down into cells. Continuing the analogy, a segment of
the SIETC can be considered as a city with its own Mobile
Telephone Switching Office operating from the cloud.
The MSSP will then facilitate or manage the registration of
the different SCs within its cell, and manage the communi-
cation by assigning appropriate communication bandwidth as
needed.
3) Incident Identification and Reporting: As part of the
information processing within an MSSP, in particular with
the use of model-based observers, it would be possible to
identify infrastructural and/or other issues (e.g., pot holes,
accidents, stalled vehicles, etc.). The MSSP shall also identify
such incidents and communicate to the authorities via level 3
communication through the cloud.
F. Smart Connects (SCs)
The SA information generated by the MSSPs need to be
received by the different vehicles. This is done through the
SC device. The SC has three primary functions:
1) Communication with MSSPs: The SC will register itself
into an SIETC through communication with the nearest MSSP.
Then it will start sending information about its Self-Awareness
(SeA) information to the MSSP, as well as receive the SA
information from the MSSP.
2) Decision Making: The SC will then use the SA informa-
tion to make decisions on behalf of the host of the SC. If the
SC is hosted in an automobile, then it would decide on what
would be the best tactical action to be taken by the vehicle
(such as perform a lane change, slow down, accelerate, etc.).
If the SC is hosted through a wearable device or smart phone,
the SC would decide on the best indicators of information and
diagnostics to be provided to the host.
3) Decision Execution: Once the SC makes a decision, the
final function is to execute on the decision. When an SC is
hosted on a wearable device, the execution is typically in the
form of diagnostic warnings and messages. When an SC is
hosted on a DBW–enabled automobile, the SC will interface
with the DBW system through well-defined APIs, in a secure
fashion, to actually instruct the vehicle to perform maneuvers.
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G. Autonomous Driving with IEA
The actual driving of the vehicle will be done by DBW ca-
pabilities that automotive OEMs will enable in their vehicles,
with well-defined secure APIs that can be used by the SCs to
define how the vehicle needs to be driven.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING BENEFITS IN THE
PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we will develop a mathematical framework
that can be used to quantify the distribution of risk using the
proposed architecture, relative to the existing paradigm for
autonomous vehicles. Our overall rationale can be summarized
as below:
1) Given that system level failures have always been hap-
pening historically, risk is essentially an estimate of how
much aggregated “blame” will be assigned to one or
more components for which a party takes responsibility.
2) The IEA defines one functional decomposition of driv-
ing functionality and distributes the responsibility in
alignment with the functional decomposition. This is
leveraged to define the risk, for every system failure,
as the aggregated “blame” for the individual driving
function components.
3) Often multiple components fail simultaneously, and in
such cases, we need a mechanism to define the blame
for the individual components. Without any additional
information, we will assume that each of the components
at fault is equally to blame. We then can use the blame
models similar to [8]
4) For any given system failure, the aggregated blame is
the blame associated with every possible fault configu-
ration that could result in the failure, weighted by the
probability of that fault configuration.
5) To find the probability of the fault configurations we
recognize that our system is a Bayesian Graph Network,
and thereby leverage theoretical results therein.
Let an autonomous vehicle system have n components
C1, C2, · · · , Cn. A random variable Fi is used to denote
if the component i is at fault or not. Fi = 1 indicates
that the ith component is at fault and Fi = 0 indicates
otherwise. We assume the random variables F1, · · · , Fn
are mutually independent. The fault configuration of the
system is represented by F = (F1, F2, · · · , Fn). Let F
denote the set of all the possible fault configurations, i.e.,
F := {(f1, · · · , fn) : fi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, · · · , n}. The
probability that the fault configuration F is equal to some
f ∈ F is given by P (F = f).
Let S represent the set of all the possible outcomes of the
functioning of the system. These outcomes are determined
based on the severity and the risk level of the outcomes.
Depending on the state of the components in the system, one
can expect an outcome S in S. It is also assumed that the set
of outcomes in S is mutually exclusive. Let the cost associated
with the ith component be Bi, a discrete random variable. Let
the set of all the possible values for Bi be denoted as B. If the
outcome (S = s) and the fault states of all the components
(F = f ) are known, then Bi := B¯i(F = f, S = s) is a
known value; however, as the cause of an outcome is only
known through probabilities, Bi is a random variable. The cost
Bi can be viewed as the “blame” or “responsibility” assigned
to the ith component, and depends on the fault configuration
and the outcome of the system. The random variables and their
causal relationships is shown as a Bayesian network in Fig.7
for a system with three components. This Bayesian network
provides a model of the joint distribution of all the random
variables in the system and their conditional dependencies.
F1 F2 F3
B1 B2 B3
Fault status of the components
Cost associated with the components
Outcome
S
Figure 7: A Bayesian network for the autonomous vehicle
system with 3 components.
The expected value of Bi is then equal to∑
s∈S Exp(Bi/S = s)P (S = s). We now derive the
expected value of Bi given the outcome S = s.
Exp(Bi/S = s) =
∑
y∈B
yP (Bi = y/S = s)
=
∑
y∈B
y
∑
f∈F
P (Bi = y/F = f, S = s)P (F = f/S = s)
=
∑
f∈F
∑
y∈B
yP (Bi = y/F = f, S = s)P (F = f/S = s)
=
∑
f∈F
B¯i(F = f, S = s)P (F = f/S = s)
=
∑
f∈F
B¯i(F = f, S = s)
P (S = s/F = f)P (F = f)
P (S = s)
=
1
P (S = s)
∑
f∈F
B¯i(F = f, S = s)P (S = s/F = f)P (F = f).
(1)
Based on a Hazards analysis (e.g. see ISO26262 HAZOP),
we can infer the conditional probability, P (S = s/F = f);
that is, the likelihood of an outcome for a given fault configu-
ration of the components. This is part of the standard process
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leading to ASIL levels for the component, which in turn leads
to the level of scrutiny and verification performed on the
component. Note that in the above equations, P (S = s) and
P (F = f) =
∏
i P (Fi = fi), can be inferred from analysis
of historical traffic and component data.
A. Example
To illustrate the computation of costs, consider the
proposed architecture with three components: 1) Drive-By-
Wire system, 2) Situational awareness generator, and 3)
Decision making module. Suppose the cost of an outcome
given the fault configuration and a scenario be defined as
B¯i(F = f, S = s) :=
fi∑
i fi
. Let P (Fi = 1) = pi for all
i = 1, · · · , 3. Let S := {s1, s2, s3, s4}. The outcomes are
organized sequentially in accordance to their severity levels
such that s1 represents an outcome with no accident and s4
denotes an outcome with severe costs. s1 happens only when
no component is at fault, i.e., F = (0, 0, 0). In general, si
occurs if exactly (i + 1) components are at fault.
Let us compute Exp(Bi/S = s3) for i = 1, 2, 3.
Exp(B1/S = s3)
=
1
P (S = s3)
∑
f∈F
f1∑
i fi
P (S = s3/F = f)P (F = f)
=
1
P (S = s3)
∑
f∈{(1,1,0),(1,0,1)}
f1∑
i fi
P (S = s3/F = f)P (F = f)
=
1
P (S = s3)
∑
f∈{(1,1,0),(1,0,1)}
1
2
P (F = f)
=
p1(p2(1− p3) + (1− p2)p3)
2P (S = s3)
. (2)
Similarly,
Exp(B2/S = s3) =
p2(p1(1− p3) + (1− p1)p3)
2P (S = s3)
(3)
and,
Exp(B3/S = s3) =
p3(p1(1− p2) + (1− p1)p2)
2P (S = s3)
. (4)
Therefore, if the components are distributed, the cost or
penalty incurred by each component is given by equations (2),
(3) and (4) respectively. However, if all the components are
controlled by a centralized entity, then the total cost incurred
by this entity is given by:
∑
i
Exp(Bi/S = s3)
=
p1 + p2 + p3 + p1p2 + p2p3 + p1p3 − 3p1p2p3
2P (S = s3)
. (5)
Suppose p1 = 0.05, p2 = 0.1 and p3 = 0.3, then
Exp(B1/S = s3) ∝ 17, Exp(B2/S = s3) ∝ 32 and
Exp(B3/S = s3) ∝ 42. Therefore, the proportion of responsi-
bility assigned to the DBW system will be 100× 1791 ≈ 18.6%.
Similarly, the proportion of responsibility assigned to the
Situational awareness generator will be 100 × 3291 ≈ 35.2%
and the proportion for the Decision making module will be
100× 4291 ≈ 46.2%.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a novel approach to accelerate the
deployment of autonomous driving and correspondingly reap
its benefits. Our concept is based on leveraging the explosive
growth in connectedness and the possibilities it engenders.
Specifically, we propose to reengineer the sensing and decision
making of the autonomous car so that a significant portion
of it is done external to the car in the infrastructure. First
of all, the stationary nature of the infrastructure, including
knowing the ground-truth about the location of all instruments,
provides a superior situational awareness information to work
with. More importantly, the proposed approach results in a fun-
damental re-distribution of the responsibilities and liabilities,
that incentivizes the eco-system of businesses to accelerate the
deployment of autonomous vehicles.
A. Value Proposition
If the IEA system could be implemented, there would
benefits to several parties as below:
• Automotive OEMs: OEMs stand to benefit the most from
the availability of an IEA system, because this allows
them to focus their efforts and energy on their core
competencies and build safer cars. Most importantly, they
will have a more manageable liability.
– In the extreme scenario, OEMs do not need to add
any sensors beyond what is available in production
cars of today. On the other hand, they could continue
to build navigation capabilities that could be used
outside of the SIETCs and could be deployed at a
pace with which they might be comfortable.
• Infrastructure Operators: For infrastructure operators such
as toll-booth operators as well as cell phone operators,
the management of the infrastructure associated with
the SIETCs would be an expansion of their current
markets. the SIETCs create new markets and offer new
opportunities for monetization of their services, breathing
new life into businesses that are becoming more and more
commoditized.
• Device Makers: The MSSP and the SCs become very rich
business opportunities for entrepreneurs and businesses to
begin manufacturing and installing on the infrastructure.
• SC Application Makers: The SC is not just used for
driving the automobile. It can be used to communicate
warnings and diagnostics to non-automated entities such
as pedestrians and bicyclists and manually driven cars.
This offers plenty of opportunities for entrepreneurs and
businesses to come up with new applications either
working with the smartphones or the native SCs.
• Law enforcement, Infrastructure Maintenance, and Traffic
Management: The presence of the infrastructure and
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sensing capabilities provides opportunities for newer ap-
plications leveraging the infrastructure to support traffic
management, infrastructure maintenance, and law en-
forcement.
• Society at Large: The new paradigm will accelerate the
penetration of automated driving overall, and correspond-
ingly accelerate the reaping of the societal, environmental
and economic benefits expected from autonomous vehi-
cles in general.
This article has only proposed a concept for enabling
autonomous driving. There are still many open research ques-
tions that need to be addressed in order to develop and
realize this concept. But beyond the research, there are many
questions that lead us to end with a note of caution: While
the proposed concept is a powerful new way of looking
at autonomous driving, we end this article with important
questions that remain to be addressed before this concept will
be feasible, as follows:
1) While we have developed a mathematical framework
to show how the risk is reduced, will/can the liability
be split in practice between the OEMs, infrastructure
providers, and third-party companies?
2) How vulnerable will the IEA system be to cybersecurity
issues?
3) Will the OEMs be willing to part with the collat-
eral opportunities presented by going fully autonomous
specifically, the ability to acquire massive amounts of
data that can be monetized on its own merit?
4) Will the OEMs be willing to work with each other to
promote a common standard for communication with the
infrastructure? This has been a challenge even with the
simplified Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) for V2I and
V2V initiatives.
5) Will the commercial infrastructure companies be willing
to invest given the need to interface and liaison with
a multitude of local government agencies in whose
jurisdiction the infrastructure will lie?
6) Can we clearly demonstrate that the technology will
indeed be superior to existing purely autonomous vehicle
technologies?
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